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Objects in the environment have a perceived value that can be changed through social influence. A subtle
way to influence object evaluation is through eye gaze: Objects looked at by others are perceived as more
likable than objects that are not looked at. In 3 experiments, we directly tested the hypothesis that this
liking effect depends on the processing of the intentional relation between other’s eye gaze and the object
being looked at. To this end, we used a novel paradigm in which participants observed a face looking left
or right behind an opaque barrier. Under all tested conditions, we found a gaze cueing effect on attention:
Looked-at objects were categorized faster than looked-away objects. In contrast, observed gaze only led
to a boost in affective evaluation for the target object when observers had the impression that the face
could see the object behind the barrier, but not when observers had the impression that the face could not
see the object. These findings indicate that observers make a sophisticated use of social gaze cues in the
affective evaluation of objects: Objects looked at by others are liked more than objects looked away but
only when others can see the objects.
Keywords: intentional gaze, object desirability, liking effect, gaze cueing
Humans use the reactions of others to help determine what is
valuable: what to eat, what is dangerous, and what is attractive.
Virtually all of the objects we interact with in our daily life, from
food to money, have a perceived value, which can be changed
through social influence (Campbell-Meiklejohn, Bach, Roepstorff,
Dolan, & Frith, 2010). A simple way to influence others’ affective
evaluations of objects is through eye gaze direction. Objects
looked at by other people do not only receive more attention: They
are also more likable (Bayliss, Paul, Cannon, & Tipper, 2006).
In recent years there has been considerable progress in describ-
ing the features of this liking effect. For instance, objects looked at
are preferred over those looked away from when the target face is
smiling, but not when the face expresses disgust (Bayliss,
Frischen, Fenske, & Tipper, 2007; for a similar effect on face
stimuli, see Jones, DeBruine, Little, Burriss, & Feinberg, 2007).
Similarly, liking is increased for objects looked by a trustworthy-
looking face. However, when the face appears untrustworthy, the
effect is reversed: objects associated with an untrustworthy face
are liked better when looked away from than when looked at
(Treinen, Corneille, & Luypaert, 2012; see also King, Rowe, &
Leonards, 2011). Object affective evaluation is also influenced by
the pattern or history of gaze shifts. For example, liking is in-
creased when the target face engages with the observer by making
eye contact, then gazing at the object, and finally looking back at
the observer (Van der Weiden, Veling, & Aarts, 2010). Finally,
liking effects can also be elicited during action observation, with
objects that are seen to be manipulated being liked more than other
objects—and such effects themselves can be dependent on social
gaze (Hayes, Paul, Beuger & Tipper, 2008; see also Lebreton,
Kawa, Forgeot d=Arc, Daunizeau & Pessiglione, 2012).
These findings suggest that social gaze-mediated liking is not
purely the by-product of associative learning (see Bry, Treinen,
Corneille, & Yzerbyt, 2011), nor a mere consequence of observing
averted gaze (Van der Weiden et al., 2010) or reflexive gaze
cueing of attention (Bayliss et al., 2006). The extent to which the
liking effect involves making assumptions about others’ internal
states remains, however, controversial (Corneille, Mauduit, Strick,
& Holland, 2009; see also Treinen et al., 2012).
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1
Other people’s looking behavior can be represented on various
different levels, ranging from the representation of its purely
physical properties to the representation of seeing as an intentional
act directed toward a specific object (Blakemore, Boyer, Pachot-
Clouard, Meltzoff, Segebarth, et al., 2003; Castelli, Happé, Frith,
& Frith, 2000; den Ouden, Frith, Frith, & Blakemore, 2005;
Pelphrey & Morris, 2006). The aim of our present study was to
seek direct evidence that the liking effect depends on the process-
ing of the intentional relation between other’s eye gaze and the
object being looked at (Becchio, Bertone, & Castiello, 2008).
A precondition for the intentional interpretation of gaze is that
the target face not only looks in the direction of the object, but also
can see the object (Nuku & Bekkering, 2008; Teufel et al., 2009;
Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, & Davis, 2010). Is the social transmission
of preference via gaze dependent on the belief that the other person
can see the object? In other words, does liking require that the
target face can see the object?
In the conventional gaze cueing paradigm used to study the gaze-
induced liking effect the face directly looks at (and therefore can
“see”) the target object. It is therefore not possible to determine
whether the effects on object evaluation depend on “seeing” the object
or merely on “looking in the direction of” the object. To disentangle
these two factors in the present study, we introduced a novel meth-
odology based on an adaptation of the ‘barriers paradigm’ (Moll &
Tomasello, 2004). In the classic barriers paradigm, used to investigate
whether and to what extent young infants understand looking as an act
of seeing, the experimenter looks toward a target object that, from the
infant’s point of view, is hidden behind a barrier. If the infant follows
the experimenter’s gaze without understanding the intentional nature
of looking, she will only look in the direction of the opaque barrier.
However, if the infant understands that the adult is looking at some-
thing, she will move around the barrier to see what the adult is seeing.
Critically, no response to the experimenter’s head turn should be
expected when the adult’s line of sight is blocked in some way (e.g.,
with a blindfold or an opaque barrier) and the adult is therefore unable
to see the object (Butler, Caron, & Brooks, 2000).
Following this logic, in our task participants observed a face
looking left or right at a location hidden from the participants’
view by opaque occluders. Then the occluders moved over and
obscured the face and an object either appeared at the location
where the face had previously looked at (cued trials) or at the other
side (uncued trials). The factor manipulated was the intentional
contingency between gaze shift and object appearance; that is, the
impression that the face could see or could not see the object
behind the occluders. If the liking effect results from the process-
ing of the intentional relation between others’ eye gaze and the
object being looked at, the ability of the face to see the object
should be the critical variable in producing the effect. Therefore,
irrespective of the presence of occluders, cued objects should be
rated more favorably when observers have the impression that the
face could see the object (intentional contingency preserved). By
contrast, gaze shifts should have no influence on the affective
appraisal of objects when observers have the impression that the
face could not see the objects (intentional contingency disrupted).
We tested these predictions in three experiments. Experiment 1
was designed to replicate the liking effect for looked-at objects
using the conventional gaze cueing paradigm in which the object
appears while the face is looking one direction or the other with no
barrier present at any time (i.e., object and face copresent; Bayliss
et al., 2006). To test whether object liking depends on seeing rather
than on mere looking in the direction of an object, in Experiment 2
and 3 we used barriers to manipulate the participants’ impression of
what the face could see during each trial (see Figure 1). In Experiment
2 the moving panels were used to prevent simultaneous visual access
to the face and the object, while aiming to maintain the impression
that the face could see the object. In Experiment 3, the panels moved
in a slightly different way, aiming to give the impression that the face
could not see the object at any time.
To briefly preempt our results, we found a gaze cueing effect on
attention in each experiment, independently of the participants’
impression that the face could or could not see the object. More-
over, we found a significant gaze liking effect in both Experiments
1 and 2, showing that the copresence of object and face is not
necessary for the liking effect to emerge. Critically, however, the
gaze liking effect was abolished in Experiment 3, meaning that the
deciding factor for the emergence of the gaze liking effect is
whether the face is able to see the object. Follow-up analyses
confirmed that the subjective experience of the participant in
these experiments is a key determinant in the emergence of the
gaze liking effect. This finding provides a notable demonstra-
tion of the sophisticated use observers make of gaze cue in the
affective evaluation of objects: Objects looked at by others are
liked more than objects looked away but only when others can
see the objects.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 was designed to replicate the basic liking effect
for objects being looked at (Bayliss et al., 2007, Experiment 1).
This was needed to check whether the key manipulation of using
occluding panels in Experiments 2 and 3 resulted in patterns of
data—in terms of both attentional and affective consequences of
observing other’s gaze—comparable to those obtained using the
original paradigm.
Method
Participants. Eighteen graduate and undergraduate students
from the University of Turin (3 male and 15 female, mean age:
23.3 years, age range: 21–30 years) volunteered for this study. All
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, gave
informed consent and were naïve with respect to the purpose of the
study.
Apparatus and stimuli. Stimulus presentation and data col-
lection were controlled by E-Prime2 (Psychology Software Tools,
Inc. Sharpsburg, PA). Stimuli were presented 60 cm away from the
participant on a 17.3-inch computer screen (16:9 aspect ratio,
1600  900 pixels resolution).
Twelve unfamiliar faces (six males, six females) with moder-
ately positive facial expression were used as cue stimuli. The faces
from the NimStim face set varied between 6.5 and 8.5 cm in width,
and between 9.7 and 10.3 cm in height. They had three possible
gaze directions: pupils straight ahead, pupils averted leftward,
pupils averted rightward. The eye regions were approximately 0.5
cm high and 3.5 cm in width. The faces were presented in the
center of the screen, and which face produced the cue on each trial
was randomized. The fixation cross, which preceded each trial,
measured 0.4  0.4 cm.
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2 MANERA, ELENA, BAYLISS, AND BECCHIO
The target stimuli consisted of 28 images of household objects
(Bayliss et al., 2006, 2007): 14 garage items (e.g., a saw, a
screwdriver, a drill), and 14 kitchen items (e.g., a saucepan, a
spoon, a mug). Images were digitally manipulated in Adobe Pho-
toshop to create four different color versions of each object (blue,
red, yellow, and green). Thus, there were a total of 112 possible
target stimuli that could appear in their original orientation or
flipped about the vertical axis. Objects varied between 1.5 cm and
5.5 cm in width, and between 1.0 cm and 3.9 cm in height. They
were presented on the left or on the right of the cueing face, so that
the center of the target was in line with gaze direction and approx-
imately 12.5 cm from the center of the screen.
For the recording of preference ratings of the stimuli, a chart (in
Italian) was presented, with the question “How much did you like
that object?” at the top of the screen and with a column of numbers
from 9 to 1, headed by the words “Like very much” at the top and
the words “Don’t like at all” at the bottom of the screen.
Design. We used a within-subjects design with cueing as the
within-subject factor. The cueing factor was whether the target
object was looked at (cued), or looked away from (uncued). The
manner in which the targets (kitchen/garage items) were presented
to each participant was controlled as in previous reports (Bayliss et
al., 2007). Although each object could appear in four colors, each
participant would see only two color versions of each object: One
version of the object would be looked at by the face stimulus each
time it appeared, whereas the other version would be looked away
from each time it appeared. To compensate for any problems for
which the participants might simply rate objects in their favorite
color more highly, we randomized which color was selected for
each target, for each participant. Furthermore, which exemplar of
each colored target would serve as the consistently cued item and
the consistently uncued item across six exposures was also ran-
domly assigned.
Procedure. Participants completed six blocks, five standard
cuing blocks followed by a final rating block. In the standard
cueing trials of Blocks 1 to 5, the participants were asked to fixate
the fixation cross, to refrain from eye movements, to ignore the
uninformative gaze cue, and to respond to the target as quickly as
possible. Each trial started with a 600-ms fixation cross. The face
would then appear, with eyes gazing straight ahead for 1500 ms.
Then, 500 ms before target onset, the eyes would move to the left
or the right. The target remained visible until response or until
2500 ms had elapsed. Participants used the “h” and “spacebar”
keys to respond to the category of the target object. Whether “h”
corresponded to “Garage” or “Kitchen” items was counterbalanced
between participants. At response, a tone was sounded to give
feedback on performance (a “bell” for correct and a “buzzer” for
incorrect/timeout). Finally, a 500-ms blank interval preceded the
next trial. After 10 practice trials (using different target objects)
participants completed five blocks of 56 trials, where each target
was viewed once in each block.
In the final (sixth) rating block, the procedure changed slightly. The
participants were now informed that following their target categori-
zation response, a blank screen would be presented (500 ms), fol-
lowed by a ratings screen. They were required to rate the item they
had just responded to, so that higher scores were given to objects that
Figure 1. Illustration of the time course of an experimental trial (for a cued target) in Experiment 2 (a) and
Experiment 3 (b). In both experiments, the trial started with a 600-ms fixation cross (not depicted), followed by
the face with eyes gazing straight ahead for 1500 ms, and by the gaze shift (a). In Experiment 2, 500 ms after
the gaze shift the panels slid horizontally toward the center of the screen so as to cover the face stimulus. The
object was uncovered 130 ms after the panel-sliding onset, that is, 630 ms after the gaze shift, when the eyes were
completely hidden. The object remained visible until response or until 2500 ms elapsed (b). In Experiment 3, 400
ms after the gaze shift the panels slid horizontally toward the center of the screen, and covered the face
completely after 80 ms. The target appeared instantaneously 150 ms after the closure of the panels, that is, 630
ms after the gaze shift, and remained visible until response or until 2500 ms elapsed.
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3SEEING IS MORE THAN LOOKING
they preferred. They were told to select a number from 1 to 9, and to
press the corresponding key on the keyboard. After their liking rating,
another blank screen (500 ms) preceded the next trial.
In total, therefore, the participants completed 336 trials of the
gaze-cueing procedure, being exposed six times to 28 cued targets
and six times to 28 uncued targets. They rated each of these 56
targets once in the final (sixth) block.
Results and Discussion
Gaze cueing of attention. Accuracy in categorizing the targets
over the six blocks was 97.3% (all participants reached our criterion
of 90% accuracy; ranging from 92.0% to 100% of correct responses).
For errors, the effect of cueing was nonsignificant, t(17) .13, p
.898,1 dz  .03. Analysis of mean reaction times (RTs) revealed the
standard gaze cueing effect, with RTs being shorter to cued targets
(M  717 ms, SD  104 ms) than to uncued targets (M  767 ms,
SD  102 ms), t(17)  9.63, p  .001, dz  2.27 (see Figure 2).
Hence, we replicated the standard gaze cueing effect (Driver et al.,
1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; see Frischen et al., 2007, for
review).
Object ratings. Ratings given in the sixth block were compared
for cued and uncued items. In line with previous studies (Bayliss et al.,
2006, 2007), we found a significant effect of cueing on object ratings,
t(17) 2.28, p .036, dz .54, with the items that were consistently
looked at throughout the experiment being rated more preferable
(M  5.51, SD  .82) than were the items consistently looked away
from (M  5.29, SD  .86; see Figure 2).
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 confirmed that objects that are consistently looked
at by other persons are rated as more likable compared to objects
consistently not looked at, replicating previous work (Bayliss et
al., 2006, 2007). A critical test for the hypothesis that liking
depends on seeing rather than on mere looking is to examine
whether, in the absence of directly observing the face gaze toward
the object, seen objects are nevertheless rated as more likable
compared with unattended objects. To this aim, in Experiment 2
we introduced horizontal occluding panels. At the beginning of the
trial, the occluding panels were presented on the left and the right
of the cueing face, so that the face was fully visible in between.
After the gaze shift occurred, the panels moved horizontally to-
ward the center of the screen so as to cover the face and to reveal
the object on the left or right side. As a result, the eyes and the
object were never simultaneously visually available to the ob-
server. However, because the object emerged from behind the
occluding panels, we expected that participants would still have
the impression that, on cued trials, the face had been able to see the
object (see Figure 1). We predicted that—despite the drastic
manipulation produced by the introduction of the moving panels—
observed gaze direction would still have an impact on spatial
attention, facilitating RTs to cued objects relative to uncued ob-
jects (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). Moreover,
if seeing is critical for the liking effect, participants should still rate
more favorable objects looked at than objects looked away even if
the gaze behavior toward the object can only be inferred.
Method
Participants. Forty-nine graduate and undergraduate students
from the University of Turin volunteered for this study. Although
we anticipated that our procedure would give the impression that
the face could see the object on cued trials, our postexperiment
manipulation check—whereby we asked “Could the face see the
1 p values always refer to two-tailed tests.
Figure 2. a, c, e: Bar charts (with standard error bars) illustrating the
average reaction times (RTs) for cued (gray) and uncued (white) items in
the three experiments (b, d, f). Bar charts (with standard error bars)
illustrating the average ratings (between 1 and 9) for cued (gray) and
uncued (white) items in the three experiments.
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4 MANERA, ELENA, BAYLISS, AND BECCHIO
objects when the eyes looked toward the same side of the screen at
which the object appeared?”—found that 21 participants were
convinced that the face could not see the objects on cued trials.2
These participants were thus excluded from the current analysis.
One additional participant exceeded 10% of errors in the catego-
rization task and was also excluded. The final sample therefore
consisted of 27 participants (four male and 23 female, mean age
20.2 years, age range  19–28 years). All participants reported
normal or corrected-to-normal vision, gave informed consent, and
were naïve with respect to the purpose of the study. None of the
Experiment 2 participants had participated in Experiment 1.
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli, design, and procedure
were identical to Experiment 1, except that two horizontal occlud-
ing panels (measuring 11.7  13.0 cm) were added. At the
beginning of the trial, the occluding panels were presented on the
left and the right of the cueing face, so that the face was fully
visible in between. Five hundred milliseconds after the gaze shift,
the panels slid horizontally toward the center of the screen so as to
cover the face stimulus and to reveal an object on the left or right
side. The target was uncovered 130 ms after the panel-sliding onset
(i.e., 630 ms after the gaze shift), when the eyes were completely
hidden by the barriers (see Figure 1). As a result, the eyes and the
object were never visually available at the same time. However,
because the object emerged from behind the occluding panels on
the same plane of the face, participants still had the impression
that, on cued trials, the face had been able to see the object (see
Figure 1). The target remained visible until response or until 2500
ms elapsed. After completing the experimental session, partici-
pants were asked whether during the experiment they had had the
impression that the face could see the object on cued trials. Only
participants reporting that the face could see the object in cued
trials were included in the analysis (see Participants section).
Results and Discussion
Gaze cueing. Accuracy in categorizing the targets over the six
blocks was 96.6% (ranging from 91.1% to 100% of correct re-
sponses). For errors, the effect of cueing was nonsignificant,
t(26)  .59, p  .558, dz  .11. Analysis of RTs revealed the
standard gaze-cueing effect, with RTs being shorter to cued targets
(M  686 ms, SD  93 ms) than to uncued targets (M  718 ms,
SD  104 ms), t(26)  5.54, p  .001, dz  1.07 (see Figure 2).
Object ratings. Consistent with Experiment 1, there was a
significant effect of cueing on object ratings, t(26)  2.62, p 
.015, dz  .50, with the items that were consistently looked at
throughout the experiment being rated more preferable (M 5.56,
SD  .65) than were the items consistently looked away from
(M  5.38, SD  .67). This demonstrates that the copresence of
gaze and object is not necessary for the liking effect to occur—at
least in individuals who report that they had the subjective impres-
sion that the face could see the cued objects.
Hence, despite the introduction of horizontal moving panels that
prevented simultaneous visual access to the face and the object,
Experiment 2 replicated both the standard effect of gaze cues on
attention and on affective evaluations.
Experiment 3
Provided that observers know that the object has been seen by
the face stimulus, the liking effect is observed even when, during
gaze shift, the critical object is hidden from view (Experiment 2).
To investigate whether seeing is indeed the key factor in deter-
mining the effect, in Experiment 3 we manipulated the timing of
the appearance of the object after the gaze shift so that instead of
emerging from behind the occluding panels, the object instanta-
neously appeared “from nothing” after the closure of the panels on
the face stimulus. Under these circumstances, the face stimulus is
supposed to be unable to see the object behind the panels. We
therefore predict that despite moving panels were identical to those
of Experiment 2, no liking effect should be observed in Experi-
ment 3. However, as the gaze direction can be correctly processed
by the visual attention system, a gaze cueing effect on attention
should nevertheless be observed.
Method
Participants. Thirty-four graduate and undergraduate students
from the University of Turin volunteered for this study. Although we
anticipated that our procedure would give the impression that the face
could not see the object in the cued trials, our postexperiment manip-
ulation check whereby we asked “Could the face see the objects when
the eyes looked toward the same side of the screen at which the object
appeared?” revealed that seven participants were convinced that the
face could see the objects on cued trials and were therefore excluded
from the present analysis. One additional participant was excluded
because more than 10% of her judgments in the categorization task
were incorrect. The final sample comprised 26 participants (six male
and 20 female, mean age 24 years, age range 19–38 years). All
participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, gave in-
formed consent and were naïve with respect to the purpose of the
study. None of the Experiment 3 participants had participated in
Experiments 1 and 2.
Stimuli and procedure. The stimuli, the design, and the pro-
cedure were identical to Experiment 2, except for the timing (onset
and speed) of the panels’ sliding. At the beginning of each trial, the
occluding panels were presented on the left and the right of the
cueing face as in Experiment 2. The barrier sliding was faster
compared to Experiment 2, and the target appeared instantaneously
150 ms after the closure of the occluding panels on the face
stimulus (see Figure 1). This manipulation generated the impres-
sion that the object appeared suddenly from nothing after the panel
closure, instead of being gradually revealed by the panels’ sliding.
To keep the time that elapsed between gaze shift and object onset
constant as compared to Experiment 2 (630 ms), the panels’ sliding
started 400 ms after the gaze shift and took 80 ms to complete. As
in Experiment 2, the face stimulus and object were never visually
available at the same time. The objects remained visible until
response or until 2500 ms elapsed. After completing the experi-
mental session, participants were asked whether during the exper-
iment they had had the impression that the face could see the
2 As detailed below, in Experiment 2, the eyes and the object were never
simultaneously visually available to the observer. It is thus possible that
some participants did not form the impression that the face could see the
object or only formed a very weak impression. The manipulation check
ensured that only participants reporting the impression that the face could
see the object in cued trials were included in the analysis of Experiment 2.
For an alternative way to interrogate the data according to the impression
reported by participants, please see the Comparing Performance Across
Experiments section.
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5SEEING IS MORE THAN LOOKING
object on cued trials. Only participants reporting that the face
could not see the object in cued trials were included in the analysis.
Results and Discussion
Gaze cueing. Accuracy in categorizing the targets over the six
blocks was 96.6% (ranging from 93.8% to 99.4% of correct
responses). For errors, the effect of cueing was nonsignificant,
t(25)  .70, p  .488, dz  .14. Analysis of RTs revealed the
standard gaze cueing effect, with RTs being shorter to cued items
(M  698 ms, SD  95 ms) than to uncued items (M  726 ms,
SD  98 ms), t(25)  4.34, p  .001, dz  .85 (see Figure 2).
This means that although these participants did not think that the
face could see the cued objects, they nevertheless processed the
gaze cue and shifted spatial attention in the direction of the cue.
Object ratings. The effect of cueing on object ratings was not
statistically significant, t(25)  .22, p  .832, dz  .04, with the cued
items (M 5.33, SD .83) liked as much as the uncued items (M
5.31, SD  .85; see Figure 2). These findings suggest that when the
face is unable to see the object, gaze shifts do not evoke liking effects.
By contrast, a strong gaze cueing effect emerges. This is an important
aspect of our data, as it rules out the possibility that the absence of
liking might be due to the disrupted encoding of gaze direction per se:
If occluding panels interfered with the encoding of gaze direction, no
gaze cueing should emerge.
Comparing Performance Across Experiments
Each of our experiments showed that gaze cueing of attention
was robust despite our occluder manipulations. Critically, although
gaze-cueing of attention was significantly stronger in Experiment
1 than in Experiment 2 (mean difference in RTs between cued and
uncued items: 50 ms vs. 32 ms; t(43)  2.12, p  .040) and in
Experiment 3 (50 ms vs. 29 ms; t(42)  2.34, p  .024), no
significant difference was found between Experiments 2 and 3 (32
ms vs. 29 ms; t(51)0.40, p .688). This indicates that overall,
the presence of barriers reduced gaze cueing somewhat, but the
method of the target’s appearance from behind the barriers did not
modulate the effect of gaze cueing on attention.
In line with a priori predictions, the effect of gaze cueing on
object ratings was weaker in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 1
(.02 vs. .22; t(42)  1.81, p  .077) and in Experiment 2 (.02 vs.
.18; t(51)  1.72, p  .092); both results were trending toward
significance. On the contrary, no significant difference in object
rating was found between Experiment 2 and 1 (.18 vs. .22 on a
9-point scale; t(43)  .37, p  .716). These results suggest that the
effect of gaze shift on object liking does depend on the impression
the face can see the object. However, we were concerned that the
exclusion of participants who did not have the subjective impres-
sion that the face could see (N  21; Experiment 2) or could not
see (N  7; Experiment 3) the cued target objects might have a
bearing on our findings. Moreover, although the liking effect was
numerically weaker in Experiment 3 than in both Experiments 1
and 2, this cross-experiment comparison did not reach statistical
significance. We therefore conducted further analyses that take
into account these two points to seek supplementary, reinforcing
support for our hypotheses.3
If the liking effect is critically dependent on the seeing impression,
then it should emerge when participants judge that the face could see
the object, but not when they report the impression that the face
stimulus was unable to see the object. An alternative approach to
interrogate the data of Experiments 2 and 3 is therefore to analyze the
data according to the judgments made by participants, irrespective of
the particular barrier paradigm used. In Experiment 2 the object
emerged from behind occluding panels, to give the impression that, on
cued trials, the face was able to see the object. Twenty-one partici-
pants reported, however, the impression that the face was unable to
see the object. Similarly, in Experiment 3, seven participants reported
the face could see the object, despite the fact that the object appeared
“from nothing” after the closure of the panels.
To test the influence of subjective report, in a second analysis, we
compared gaze cueing and object ratings in participants who believed
the face could see the object from Experiments 2 and 3 (N  33, six
males and 27 females, mean age: 21 years) and participants from
Experiment 2 and 3 who believed the face could not see the object
(N  46, 11 males and 35 females, mean age: 22 years), with the
grouping factor being subjective impression (see Figure 3). Two
additional participants (one for Experiment 2, one for Experiment 3)
were excluded from the analysis because more than 10% of their
judgments in the categorization task were incorrect.
Results
Gaze cueing. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) on RTs with
cueing (cued vs. uncued) as within-subject factor and subjective
impression (face can see the object vs. face cannot see the object)
as between-subjects factor revealed a significant main effect of
cueing, F(1,77)  77.13, p  .001, with RTs being shorter to cued
items than to uncued items. Importantly, no significant interaction
between cueing and subjective impression was found, F(1,77) 
.49, p  .485, thus suggesting that the gaze-cueing effect was not
affected by the subjective impression that the face could or could
not see the object. Accordingly, paired-sample contrasts showed
the standard gaze cueing effect both for participants who believed
that the face could see the object (33 ms cueing effect on RTs,
t(32)  6.18, p  .001, dz  1.07) and for participants who
believed that the face could not see the object (29 ms cueing effect
on RTs, t(45)  6.28, p  .001, dz  .93).
Object ratings. ANOVA on object ratings with cueing (cued
vs. uncued) as within-subject factor and subjective impression
(face can see the object vs. face cannot see the object) as between-
subjects factor revealed a main effect of cueing trending toward
significance, F(1,77)  3.35, p  .071. However, this was moder-
ated by a highly significant interaction effect between cueing and
subjective impression, F(1,77) 9.91, p .002. To further explore
the interaction effect, we performed paired-sample contrasts on
object ratings for cued versus uncued items, separately for partic-
ipants who had the subjective impression that the face could see
the object and for participants who had the subjective impression
that the face could see the object. Consistent with our hypothesis,
participants who, irrespective of the paradigm used, reported the
impression that the face could see the object, showed a highly
3 An alternative way of examining the hypothesis would have been to
manipulate the critical factor (i.e., impression that the face can see the
object) within subjects. With a within-subjects design, however, the effect
of the seeing condition may have easily carried over to the nonseeing
condition, limiting the interpretation of the results.
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6 MANERA, ELENA, BAYLISS, AND BECCHIO
significant liking effect, with cued items (M  5.53, SD  .88)
rated higher than uncued items (M 5.30, SD .90), t(32) 2.80,
p .009, dz .49. On the contrary, participants who believed that
the face could not see the object liked the cued items (M  5.13,
SD  .83) as much as the uncued items (M  5.19, SD  .82),
t(45)  1.18, p  .244, dz  .18.
General Discussion
When we see someone change their direction of gaze, we
spontaneously follow their eyes (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998). Similar cueing effects are evoked by nongaze
cues, such as arrows (Bayliss, di Pellegrino, & Tipper, 2005;
Bayliss & Tipper, 2005; Bayliss, Bartlett, Naughtin, & Kritikos,
2011; Frischen et al., 2007). Yet, there is an important effect
produced by gaze cues which arrows cues fail to produce: Stimuli
perceived to be looked at by others acquire a positive valence
(Bayliss et al., 2006). A so far little-explored question is whether
or not this liking effect requires that the looking behavior of others
is conceptualized as an intentional act of seeing.
A limitation inherent in the conventional gaze cueing paradigm
is that, because the object appears while the face is looking in one
direction or the other, it not possible to determine whether liking
depends on looking in the direction of or on seeing the object.
Evidence for modulation by emotional expression (e.g., Bayliss et
al., 2007) and face trustworthiness (Treinen et al., 2012) is com-
patible with the intentional processing of other’s gaze. However,
because in these studies the target face directly looked at the
object, a mechanism that merely links the coincidence of emo-
tional expression and looking direction to the object cannot be
excluded. Similarly, without assuming any attribution of seeing, it
could be hypothesized that direct gaze to the observer increases the
perceived desirability of the gazed-at object (Van der Weiden, et
al., 2010) because it enhances the saliency of the subsequent gaze
shift.
To directly test the hypothesis that liking effect requires that
the target face sees the object (in contrast to merely looking in
the direction of the object), in three experiments we systemat-
ically manipulated the intentional contingency between gaze
shift and object appearance. Experiment 1 replicated the liking
effect for looked-at objects using the conventional gaze cueing
paradigm. In Experiments 2 and 3, we used a modified barriers
paradigm (Moll & Tomasello, 2004) to prevent simultaneous
visual access to the eyes and the object and alter the impression
that face could see the object. We found that in the presence of
occluding panels, gaze shifts influenced object desirability, but
only when the intentional contingency between gaze shift and
object appearance was preserved and participants had the im-
pression that the face stimulus could see the object behind the
panel. When the intentional contingency between gaze shift and
object appearance was disrupted and participants had the im-
pression that the face stimulus was unable to see the object, no
liking effect was observed.
Figure 3. a, b, c: Bar charts illustrating the gaze cueing of attention shown by individual participants. Bars
above the x-axis illustrate that RTs were shorter to cued items than to uncued items (d, e, f). Bar charts
illustrating the effect of cueing on object ratings shown by individual participants. Bars above the x-axis illustrate
that a participant rated cued items higher than uncued items. Bars are ordered by subjective impression and then
by order of recruitment.
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7SEEING IS MORE THAN LOOKING
Seeing Is More Than Looking
Previous studies provide indication that high-level social cog-
nition such as attributing a seeing mental state can influence the
allocation of spatial attention in response to a gaze cue (Nuku &
Bekkering, 2008; Ristic & Kingstone, 2005; Teufel et al., 2010).
For instance, reflexive gaze following has been found to be stron-
ger when observers believe that the face stimulus wears transpar-
ent goggles (and thus can see) than when they believe that the
goggles are opaque and the face can therefore not see (Teufel et al.,
2010). As transparent and opaque goggles looked identical from
the perspective of an onlooker, this indicates that coding of gaze
during alignment of attention is differently influenced by the belief
that the face can or cannot see. In the present study, we manipu-
lated the impression that the face stimulus could or could not see
the object and found that that attribution of seeing is critical for
gaze shifts to influence the affective evaluation of objects. Object
liking requires that not only the face looks in the direction of the
object but can see the object. In contrast, gaze cueing was revealed
independently from seeing, that is, both when the face stimulus
could see the object (Experiment 2) and when the face could not
see the object (Experiment 3).
At first glance, the finding that gaze cueing emerged independently
from seeing may seem to be at odds with the results of Teufel and
colleagues (2010), who suggested that attribution of seeing does
influence reflexive gaze following. This seeming contradiction can be
resolved upon consideration of differences in the experimental de-
signs. Teufel and colleagues manipulated beliefs about another per-
son’s ability to see the entire visual field (i.e., perceive). In contrast,
we manipulated the impression that the face could or could not see a
particular element of the environment—the target object, that is, the
interpretation of seeing as object-directed. In both Experiments 2 and
3 the face stimulus had the visual ability to see, however—critical-
ly—only in Experiment 2, but not in Experiment 3, the face was able
to see the target object.
Processing of object-directedness is crucial for linking the per-
ception of the gaze shift with a theory about the gaze shift’s
significance in terms of the other person’s intentions (Pelphrey &
Morris, 2006). Activity within the superior temporal sulcus—a key
region in social perception—is sensitive to object-directedness of
gaze shift (Pelphrey, Singerman, Allison, & McCarthy, 2003) and
there is evidence that object-directed gaze is used to infer motor
intentions (Pierno, Becchio, Wall, Smith, Turella et al., 2006).
Together with previous result, our findings suggest that attribution
of intentionality modulates affective responses to another’s person
gazing behavior: Objects looked at by others are liked more than
objects looked away but only when the gazing behavior of others
is interpreted as an intentional act.
Copresence of Eyes and Object
The time elapsed between gaze shift and object appearance being
equal (630 ms), object liking was enhanced when observers believed
that the face stimulus could see the object (Experiment 2), but not
when they believed that the face could not see the object (Experiment
3). An interesting implication of these results is that, provided the face
stimulus can see the object, copresence between gaze and object is not
necessary for the liking effect to emerge. In Experiment 2, moving
occluders prevented simultaneous access to the eyes and the object,
yet cued objects were rated more favorably compared to uncued
objects. This finding suggests that others’ gaze behavior may influ-
ence the desirability of objects not visible (from the observer’s point
of view) when the gaze shift takes place.
Increased liking for objects looked at by others has been proposed
to reflect an advantageous social adaptation: Others look toward
objects because they like them (Baron-Cohen, Campbell, Karmiloff-
Smith, Grant, & Walker, 1995); if they look away from them, they
probably do not. It would seem adaptive that observers accommodate
others’ preferences in their own behavior as it aids in assessing
information about the environment and objects within it (Emery,
2000). The finding that copresence of gaze and object is not necessary
for the liking effect to occur as long as the face is believed to be able
to see the object reinforces this idea and suggests that the looking
behavior of others may contribute to establish preferences for objects
that are not immediately accessible to the gaze of the observer. In this
way, gaze-mediated liking may not only alter the value of specific
visible objects but also predetermine a preference for objects tempo-
rarily occluded from view.
But when can others’ preferences be trusted? Face trustworthi-
ness has been shown to play a moderating role in establishing
object preferences (King et al., 2011; Treinen et al., 2012). At a
more basic level, however, a critical condition for trusting the
other’s preference is that he or she can see the object. When the
face is not able to see the object, no inference about the other’s
preferences is possible and no influence on affective appraisal of
objects should therefore be expected. In line with this, results of
Experiment 3 indicate that liking was abolished when observers
believed that the face could not see the object.
The influence of gaze shifts on object evaluation has been
likened to a form of mimetic desire (Corneille et al., 2009):
People’s desires are not autonomous but rather based on the
imitation of what they perceive other people desire. Our results
suggest that this mimesis might extend over time and, at least as far
as object preference is concerned, may lead to imitate others’
preferences even before the object of their preference is known.
Conclusions
Gaze provides information regarding both the outside and the
inside. From the gaze of another person we can infer information
about relevant events and objects within the external environment. At
the same time, from observing another person’s gaze we are able to
access information related to intentions and mental states of the other
person. For instance, we can infer what another person might be
interested in and what she might desire (e.g., Lee, Eskritt, Symons, &
Muir, 1998). The liking effect has been proposed to arise from the
interplay of these two aspects: We tend to transfer onto objects the
attitude we read into the eyes of others (Becchio et al., 2008). Our
findings support this assumption demonstrating that whereas gaze
cueing depends on mere looking, liking results from the processing of
the intentional relation between others’ eye gaze and the object being
looked at. Consistent with earlier reasoning on temporal dynamics of
gaze perception (Itier & Batty, 2009), it is tempting to speculate that
gaze-cueing and object liking reflect successive steps of gaze process-
ing. Provided that the face is able to see (Teufel et al., 2010), gaze
cueing emerges as a fast and almost automatic response to gaze shift
during early steps of gaze processing. Object liking relates to a more
cognitive step that influences emotional responses to the object, is
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context sensitive, and only occurs when observers have the impres-
sion that the face can see the object.
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